Myanmar–North Korea relations
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Myanmar (Burma) and North Korea established bilateral diplomatic relations in May 1975. The history of contacts between the two countries goes back to 1948, the year of the declaration of Burmese independence. Initially, however, Burma under U Nu favored Syngman Rhee's government in the south of Korea. During and after the Korean War, Burma balanced the interest of North and South Korea, taking into consideration the position of China. After the 1975 establishment of diplomatic relations Burma began to shift toward North Korea, which was also nominally socialist and equally wary of Western imperialism.[1]
The Rangoon bombing on 9 October 1983 was a turning point in Myanmar–North Korea relations. Once it found out that North Koreans were behind the attack, Myanmar cut off diplomatic relations and went as far as withdrawing formal recognition of the country. Relations began to recover during the years of the Sunshine Policy when South Korea encouraged the North's rapprochement with Myanmar. Strategic considerations brought Myanmar and North Korea even closer. Myanmar had natural resources that North Korea needed, and North Korea began supplying Myanmar with military technology. Diplomatic relations were restored on 25 April 2007.
Military cooperation between North Korea and Myanmar deepened into cooperation with nuclear issues. Myanmar is believed to operate a nuclear weapons program that seeks to emulate the success of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability. The program is supported by North Korean training and equipment. Although the 2011–2015 Myanmar political reforms have led to the cancellation or downgrading of military ties, reports on suspicious activities have continued as of 2018[update].
History
[edit]Period of good relations
[edit]Burma (Myanmar) and North Korea already had some contacts in 1948 when Burma became independent. U Nu's government, however, voted in favor of the motion in the UN that recognized Syngman Rhee's government as the legitimate government over all of Korea.[2] Burma, however, refused to recognize either state and wished to see a peaceful solution to the nascent Korean crisis. After the Korean War broke out, Burma enforced the UN Security Council resolution that labeled North Korea as the aggressor. This perceived "anti-communist" stance of Burma perplexed many, because Burma was seen as a country with a non-aligned orientation. Burma did, however, not send troops to fight in Korea.[3] When the Korean War escalated and China got involved, Burma with its long border with China, was forced to change its tone. Burma became the only non-communist country along with India not to vote for a motion that recognized China as another aggressor of the Korean War.[4]
After the war, Burma began to develop contacts in both Koreas on an unofficial setting. By 1961, there were non-ambassadorial consulates of both Koreas in Burma. Burma established formal diplomatic relations with both Koreas in May 1975, after Ne Win had taken power. During the 1970s and 1980s, North and South Korea were fighting for legitimacy in the international arena. This was also reflected in the countries' relations with Burma when both tried to match each other's outreach efforts. Both would match each other's delegations', friendship groups' and cultural troupes' visits to Burma. For the Burmese, these efforts were seen as a nuisance and a strain on its resources, but it sought to treat both Koreas evenly.[5] Relations with North Korea, however, developed to a more cordial level. Both were nominally socialist states and they shared a suspicion of Western imperialism.[1] Burma and North Korea also cooperated through the Non-Aligned Movement.[6] At the same time, however, North Korea supported Burmese anti-government guerrilla groups, particularly the Communist Party of Burma.[1] It has been alleged that it was personally important for Kim Il Sung to support communist revolutionaries. Alternatively, it has been theorised Kim might have wanted to destabilize the Burmese government to please China for political gain.[7]
Rangoon bombing and aftermath
[edit]The Rangoon bombing took place on 9 October 1983 when three North Korean agents placed a bomb in the Martyrs' Mausoleum in Rangoon (Yangon). The bomb killed 21 people, including four cabinet ministers of the President of South Korea, Chun Doo-hwan, who was visiting the country. The president himself narrowly escaped. The authorities of Myanmar hunted down the agents, killing one and capturing two, who were sentenced to death.[8]
Ne Win was angered over the embarrassment that faced him and felt personally betrayed by Kim Il Sung.[9] Myanmar expelled North Korean officials,[10] immediately cut off diplomatic relations and formally withdrew its recognition of the North Korean state on 11 November.[8][11] North Korea conducted another act of state terrorism when its agents planted a bomb on Korean Air Flight 858, which exploded near Myanmar over the Andaman Sea.[12]
Restoration of relations
[edit]Relations gradually began improving and during the years of the Sunshine Policy South Korea encouraged their restoration.[6] According to Kanbawza Win: "Self-interest has brought the two countries back together[.] North Korea benefited from Burma's natural resources, such as oil, gas and timber while Burma's rulers need access to military equipment, which has been blocked by US and European sanctions."[13] On 25 April 2007,[14] The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) that had risen to power following the 8888 Uprising, finally formally restored the relations.[15] Shwe Mann visited Pyongyang the following year in secret.[16][6] He is said to have signed a memorandum of understanding about further military cooperation with the two countries.[16]
North Korea began to support the SPDC by supplying weapons. These included and small arms ammunition, 130 mm field guns, and ship mounted surface-to-surface missiles. North Korean freighters would frequent the ports of Myanmar and technicians would visit the country, including at the Monkey Point naval facility in Yangon.[15] In Naypyidaw, North Korean military engineers constructed shelters for the Tatmadaw. There were plans to buy a North Korean submarine. These activities caused international alarm.[15]
Cooperation on nuclear issues
[edit]Myanmar and North Korea are believed to cooperate on nuclear issues with the goal of a nuclear weapons program of Myanmar.[17] The military of Myanmar was motivated because it "couldn't help but notice how North Korea stood up to the US, a harsh critic of the Burmese regime, mainly due to its nuclear program." There is, however, skepticism in the international community regarding the issue because similar accusations concerning Iraq were proven false.[18] In 2003, Myanmar sent 30 officials to North Korea to study reactor technology.[17] Another possibility is that they went to North Korea to train using missiles, which Myanmar wanted to buy from the country but could not afford at that point.[18] The SPDC has contemplated purchasing an entire nuclear reactor from North Korea.[16] In 2006, they started buying from North Korea tools required to construct a reactor. North Korea has bought uranium from Myanmar, which in turn has purchased North Korean equipment for uranium enrichment and plutonium production. North Korean nuclear experts are working in the Tha Beik Kyin area of Myanmar.[13]
The North Korean cargo ship MV Bong Hoafan was seen in a port of Myanmar in November 2006. Officially, she was sheltering from a storm, but foreign diplomats were concerned about the ship's presence. Next year, just days after diplomatic relations were restored, another North Korean ship, the Kang Nam 1, arrived at Thilawa Port. She too was said to shelter from a strom, but after two Burmese journalists hired by a Japanese news agency investigated the ship, they were detained. It is possible that the ship was visiting Myanmar in connection to the country's nuclear program.[18]
In 2008, the US blocked the flight of an Air Koryo Ilyushin Il-62 from a stopover in Mandalay in Myanmar to Iran,[17][18] believing it was carrying gyroscopes for missile guidance systems.[17] In January 2009, a weapons specialist from North Korean died in Myanmar while working on a secret project in Meiktila. His remains were quickly repatriated.[17] In June that year, tensions mounted as a US navy ship followed a North Korean vessel near the port of Yangon.[19]
Myanmar is relying on North Korea for nuclear cooperation because it is worried about ties with Russia. In the eventuality that its relationship with Russia deteriorates, North Korea will remain an important ally in nuclear matters.[13] China, friendly with both Myanmar and North Korea, has not commented negatively on the possible nuclear cooperation between the two states.[20]
With the 2011–2015 Myanmar political reforms, military ties have been either downgraded or cut.[16] In 2018, however, the UN found that North Korea is selling ballistic and surface-to-air missiles and other weapons to Myanmar through its weapons export arm Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation.[21]
Myanmar and North Korea in Asia
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There is a North Korean embassy in Myanmar.[22] Myanmar is one of the top-10 recipients of exports from North Korea.[23]
Myanmar–North Korea relations have affected Myanmar's relations with countries such as the United States and Japan. These countries have supported normalization of relations among themselves and Myanmar so as to deter North Korea from gaining an ally in Southeast Asia.[16]
Myanmar and North Korea are often compared to one another. Both neighbor China,[24] both are heavily militarized societies with ongoing conflict, and with isolationist policies.[25] In 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice included both under the term "outposts of tyranny".[24] Myanmar has, in the words of, Michael Green and Derek Mitchell "interest in following the model of North Korea and achieving military autarky by developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons".[17] According to American historian David I. Steinberg, both countries share a trait of nationalism rooted in insecurity and vulnerability. This characteristics explain, for instance, why the two countries, at one point, decide to change their time-zones to deviate from the international norm by half an hour.[6]
See also
[edit]- Foreign relations of Myanmar
- Foreign relations of North Korea
- Myanmar and weapons of mass destruction
- North Korea's illicit activities
References
[edit]- ^ a b c Selth 2004, p. 5.
- ^ Selth 2004, p. 1.
- ^ Selth 2004, p. 2.
- ^ Selth 2004, p. 3.
- ^ Selth 2004, p. 4.
- ^ a b c d Steinberg, David I. (11 August 2015). "Why Myanmar, North Korea are keeping their own time". Nikkei Asian Review. Retrieved 29 September 2018.
- ^ Selth 2004, p. 7.
- ^ a b Seekins 2017c, p. 452.
- ^ Selth 2004, p. 10.
- ^ Wertz, Oh & Kim 2016, p. 5.
- ^ Hoare 2012b, p. xxxvi.
- ^ Hoare 2012a, p. 44.
- ^ a b c Win, Kanbawza (21 October 2008). "The 4th Burmese Empire with Nuclear Weapon". Asian Tribune. Retrieved 1 October 2018.
- ^ Hoare 2012b, p. l.
- ^ a b c Seekins 2017b, p. 307.
- ^ a b c d e Seekins 2017b, p. 308.
- ^ a b c d e f Bechtol 2009, p. 110.
- ^ a b c d Lintner, Bertil (3 December 2008). "Burma's Nuclear Temptation". YaleGlobal Online. Retrieved 1 October 2018.
- ^ Seekins 2017a, p. xxxiii.
- ^ Nanto, Dick K.; Manyin, Mark E. (28 December 2010). China-North Korea Relations (PDF). Washington: Congressional Research Service. p. 4. OCLC 698509823.
- ^ "North Korea arming Syria, Myanmar: UN report". Al Jazeera. AFP. 3 February 2018. Retrieved 29 September 2018.
- ^ Wertz, Oh & Kim 2016, p. 2.
- ^ Haggard & Noland 2010, p. 554.
- ^ a b Abrahamian 2018, p. 2.
- ^ Abrahamian 2018, p. 3.
Works cited
[edit]- Abrahamian, Andray (2018). North Korea and Myanmar: Divergent Paths. Jefferson: McFarland. ISBN 978-1-4766-3200-1.
- Bechtol, Bruce E. (2009). "Creating Instability in Dangerous Global Regions: North Korean Proliferation and Support to Terrorism in the Middle East and South Asia". Comparative Strategy. 28 (2): 99–115. doi:10.1080/01495930902799699. ISSN 0149-5933. S2CID 154986858.
- Haggard, Stephan; Noland, Marcus (2010). "Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation". Asian Survey. 50 (3): 539–568. doi:10.1525/as.2010.50.3.539. ISSN 0004-4687.
- Hoare, James E. (2012a). "Andaman Sea Bombing". Historical Dictionary of Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. p. 44. ISBN 978-0-8108-7987-4.
- — (2012b). "Chronology". Historical Dictionary of Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. pp. xxvii–lx. ISBN 978-0-8108-7987-4.
- Seekins, Donald M. (2017a). "Chronology". Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. xxv–xxxv. ISBN 978-1-5381-0183-4.
- — (2017b). "Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea), Relations with". Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 307–308. ISBN 978-1-5381-0183-4.
- — (2017c). "Rangoon Incident". Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 452. ISBN 978-1-5381-0183-4.
- Selth, Andrew (2004). Burma's North Korean Gambit: A Challenge to Regional Security? (PDF). Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. ISBN 0-7315-5441-8.
- Wertz, Daniel; Oh, JJ; Kim, Insung (August 2016). Issue Brief: DPRK Diplomatic Relations (PDF). The National Committee on North Korea. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 December 2016. Retrieved 19 January 2017.
Further reading
[edit]- Babson, Bradley (2001). "Myanmar and North Korea: Informality in Asia's Pariah States". SAIS Review. 21 (1): 83–95. doi:10.1353/sais.2001.0003. ISSN 1088-3142. S2CID 154129715.
- Hoare, James E. (2012). "Myanmar, Relations with". Historical Dictionary of Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Lanham: Scarecrow Press. pp. 268–269. ISBN 978-0-8108-7987-4.
- Selth, Andrew (2010). "Burma and North Korea: conventional allies or nuclear partners?". Australian Journal of International Affairs. 64 (2): 145–165. doi:10.1080/10357710903544072. ISSN 1035-7718. S2CID 154120854.